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Abstract: Nowadays we are faced with an increasing popularity of social
software including wikis, blogs, micro-blogs and online social networks such
as Facebook and MySpace. Unfortunately, the mostly used social services are
centralized and personal information is stored at a single vendor. This results in
potential privacy problems as users do not have much control over how their pri-
vate data is disseminated. To overcome this limitation, some recent approaches
envisioned replacing the single authority centralization of services by a peer-
to-peer trust-based approach where users can decide with whom they want to
share their private data. In this peer-to-peer collaboration it is very difficult to
ensure that after data is shared with other peers, these peers will not misbehave
and violate data privacy. In this paper we propose a mechanism that addresses
the issue of data privacy violation due to data disclosure to malicious peers. In
our approach trust values between users are adjusted according to their previ-
ous activities on the shared data. Users share their private data by specifying
some obligations the receivers must follow. We log modifications done by users
on the shared data as well as the obligations that must be followed when data
is shared. By a log-auditing mechanism we detect users that misbehaved and
we adjust their associated trust values by using any existing decentralized trust
model.
Key-words: trust, privacy, peer-to-peer collaboration, log-auditing
Une approche reposant sur l’audit pour la gestion
de la confiance dans la collaboration pair-à-pair
Résumé : Depuis quelques années nous assistons à une explosion de la popu-
larité des logiciels sociaux comme les wikis, les blogs, les micro-blogs ou encore
les réseaux sociaux tels que Facebook et MySpace. Malheureusement, les plus
usités de ces services reposent tous sur un contrôle centralisé ; les données d’un
utilisateur se retrouvant centralisées chez un seul fournisseur de service. Cela
engendre indéniablement un problème de confidentialité puisque les utilisateurs
n’ont plus le contrôle sur la manière dont leurs propres données sont diffusées.
Afin de surpasser ces limitations, plusieurs approches récentes proposent de
remplacer le contrôle centralisé de ces services par des approches pair-à-pair
reposant sur des mécanismes de confiance où chaque usager décide avec qui il
souhaite partager ces données personnelles. Toutefois, dans ce genre de collab-
oration, il est très difficile de s’assurer qu’une fois une donnée partagée avec
des pairs, celle-ci ne soit pas divulguée à d’autres pairs non autorisés. Dans cet
article, nous proposons un mécanisme qui permet de circonscrire les problèmes
de violation de confidentialité liés à la divulgation de données par des pairs
malicieux. Dans notre approche, les indices de confiance entre les usagers sont
ajustés selon le comportement passé des usagers vis-à-vis des données partagées.
Lorsqu’un usager partage des données, il impose aux autres usagers des oblig-
ations qu’ils doivent respecter. Chaque modification sur une donnée partagée
effectuée par un usager et chaque obligation est répertoriée dans un journal. En
réalisant un audit de ce journal, notre approche détecte les usagers qui se sont
mal-comportés et ajuste en conséquence leurs indices de confiance.
Mots-clés : confiance, confidentialité des données, collaboration pair-à-
pair,audit
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social software including wikis, blogs, micro-blogs and social networks has
emerged as a new interpersonal communication form. Existing micro-blogging
services such as Twitter and social networks such as Facebook or MySpace have
millions of users using them everyday. While these social services offer many at-
tractive functionalities, they require storing personal information in the hands of
a single large corporation which is a perceived privacy threat. Users are obliged
to provide and to store their data to vendors of these services and to trust that
they will preserve privacy of their data, but they have little control over the
usage of their data after sharing it with other users. These corporations could
produce a profile based on the individual behavior and therefore detrimental
decisions to an individual may be taken. Moreover, due to large amounts of
information these social services sites process every day, a single flaw in the
system could permit retrieval of large parts of personal data. For instance on
Facebook features such as messages, invitations and photos help users gain ac-
cess to private information. Moreover, flaws in the Facebook’s third-party API
have been found which allow for easy theft of private information.
Some recent approaches such as [2] proposed moving away from centralized
authority-based collaboration towards a peer-to-peer trust network where users
have full control over their personal data that they store locally and can decide
with whom to share their data. Users define their network of trust containing
people that they trust and with whom they wish to collaborate. These peer-to-
peer networks of trust overcome the disadvantages of centralized architectures by
offering a good scalability and fault-tolerance and the possibility of sharing costs
of administration. In a peer-to-peer collaboration model rather than having a
central authority which has access to all users personal data, control over data
is given to users. Therefore, the risk of privacy breaches is decreased as well as
only a part of the protected data in the peer-to-peer network may be exposed at
any time. However, in this peer-to-peer collaboration it is very difficult to ensure
that after data is shared with other peers, these peers will not misbehave and
violate data privacy. To prevent data misuse, trust management mechanisms
are used where peers are assigned trust values and a peer collaborates only with
high trusted peers. However, to our knowledge, there exists no approach that
automatically updates trust values according to peers misbehavior.
In this paper we propose an approach of log auditing for computing trust
in a peer-to-peer environment according to respecting obligations peers receive
from other peers concerning their private data. We also propose a novel audit-
based compliance control approach suited for distributed collaborative envi-
ronments where obligations are checked a-posterior and not enforced a-prior.
This approach in which usage policies are checked posteriorly is different from
prior-checked access control mechanisms. Rather than requiring a hard security
mechanism, our solution uses a trust-based approach that is more flexible for
users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of
Peer-to-Peer trust. Section 3 presents our log auditing approach in decentralized
systems. Then we describe the formal structure of log in Section 4. In Section
5 we present a discussion on obligations that are associated to logs. Section
6 describes the mechanism for local trust assessment with algorithm analysis.
RR n° 7472
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Section 7 compares our approach with related works and Section 8 presents
concluding remarks and directions of future work.
2 PEER TO PEER TRUST OVERVIEW
Peer-to-peer underlying architectures reflect society better than other types of
computer architectures [3], being better adapted to the way people think and to
user’s needs for knowledge sharing and providing users more freedom to interact
with each other. In this peer-to-peer collaboration model, it is very difficult to
ensure data privacy. According to [20], data privacy is the right of individuals
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others. A peer shares his private data only with peers
that he trusts, so, privacy of data is preserved for a direct connection with a
peer. But the main issue refers to what happens to data released to authorized
persons, i.e how the user may, must and must not use it. This issue is called
usage control [13, 4] and is modeled by means of certain obligations that users
receive together with data.
Trust is a belief or confidence in the honesty, goodness of a person or or-
ganization. In [19] a classification of trust models is given. A trust level is an
assessment of the probability that a peer will not cheat. An honest peer will be
assigned a high trust level while a malicious peer will be assigned a low trust
level. These trust levels are updated according to the peer’s behavior. If a peer
misbehaves, its trust level is decremented. The solution that we propose in this
paper for adjusting trust levels of peers according to their behavior is general
and could be combined with any existing reputation mechanism.
In order to present an overview of our approach let us consider an example
in the domain of data sharing in a social network. Suppose Alice creates a
document and she wants to share it with different friends, say Bob and Carol.
She shares it to Bob with a certain right to modify it. It is very difficult to
enforce Bob to follow that policy in a decentralized environment. Bob can do
any action on the document once received it. There is no way for Alice to
guarantee Bob will not misbehave on the document after it has been shared. In
our approach we propose a mechanism logging past actions of users concerning
shared data. Bob’s actions will be logged by the system. Alice will never know
what Bob has done with her data if Bob only keeps the log locally. But his log
of local edit actions will be disclosed to whom he continues to re-distribute data.
If Carol receives the document, she can check the log to know what actions that
Alice and Bob did.
Our system does not aim to prevent fraud. Rather, the log mechanism
provides audit capabilities in order to detect attempts at fraud after the data
has been shared and used. The local actions on data and the communications
between peers are assumed to leave some evidence and hence are observable.
The owner attaches a usage policy to the data in order to specify what actions
are allowed and under which conditions. According to this a-posterior checking,
user trust values are updated with a decrement. For checking compliance to
obligations, we audit the log containing modifications done by users on the
shared data as well as the obligations that must be followed. Each user evaluates
trust on other users and keeps trust values locally instead of storing them at
a central authority. Trust values help users decide to collaborate or not with
RR n° 7472
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other users. These values are updated after each posterior checking of the log
for detection of misbehaved users. We can use any trust model for updating
trust values. To our knowledge, our approach is the only one that addresses
data privacy violation by discovering malicious users and updating user trust
values.
3 LOG AUDITING APPROACH
Our system consists of a group of communicating peers. Each peer has its own
workspace. These peers collaborate together in creating and sharing data in a
decentralized environment where no central administration point exists. Users
are administrators themselves.
The local edit actions and communication actions among peers are logged by
the system in edit log and communication log. Each user keeps locally one edit
log and one communication log. When a user shares the document with others,
logs and usage policies will be associated with the document. The policies are
specified in communication log. Initially, the log is empty, but after certain
iterations, as observations are made, the log will grow up. The logs are created
under the following assumptions:
⋄ Logs are created automatically by system and they are unalterable. This
assumption is practical. In reality, logs could be changed but there are
some techniques as in [9] to detect or avoid log modification.
⋄ It is required that at least one obligation is given in a sharing action. In
collaboration, when the document is sent back to previous sender, it is not
required to re-define new obligations.
⋄ The occurring order of events stored in logs is maintained by logical clock
[11].
In a collaboration-based system, users are expected to behave correctly, but
they might be suspected of incorrect behaviors. A user violates an obligation
if he performs actions which are not permitted in usage policies. We update
decremently their trust values each time violations are detected. The trust value
for well-behaved peers is higher than the trust value for malicious peers. A peer
has initial trust values associated with other peers. They are calculated and
adjusted after each log analysis.
Log auditing consists in the analysis of both edit and communication logs.
Each time the user receives different versions of a same document, the system
automatically analyzes the logs in order to judge the past behaviors of other
users. An important point in checking past behaviors is to detect mismatching of
actions and obligations them. Next, the received logs that include past actions
and obligations are checked to be merged with current local logs. If the logs
should be merged, both document edit logs and communication logs are merged.
In addition to merging obligations, conflict resolution between rights is required.
4 LOG STRUCTURE
In this section, we present the structure of logs and give an example to illustrate
how logs are created and stored locally at sites of peers.
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Definition 1. An event is denoted as e = asr where a represents an action
that can be either a local action on document or a communication action, and
r represents parameters which are in form of pair of name and value. The
notation s has the temporal meaning for an event, in which s = −1 represents
the actual event that a user performed while s = +1 represents the obligation
event he has to follow.
Similar to event structure in Z language [16], each event in our log is com-
posed of an action or an obligation and several parameters. For instance,
share−1{by,P1},{to,P2} is an event of sharing the document from P1 to P2 (P1 shared
document to P2) while share
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
is an obligation P1 gives to P2 (P2
can share the document).
Definition 2. A log is composed of a time-ordered sequence of pairs (logical
clock, event): [(c1, e1), (c2, e2),..., (cm, em)].
For ordering events we use the logical clock with happened_before relation
[11] among events. Event e1 is ordered before event e2 if e1 happened before e2.
The system of each site maintains a counter that is incremented each time an
event is generated at that site. Each event is assigned the value of the counter
at the moment of its generation. This counter called also logical time cj is
simply used to order events according to their order of occurrence. The logical
clock of obligations of sender is replaced by the new logical clock of receiver
according to the order when he receives the document. This helps checking if
events generated by a user conform to obligations previously received. We can
track backward the logical clock value assigned to obligation by sender through
the logical clock value of share event. From the logical clock of share action, we
know when such obligation events are shared by the sender.
Figure 1: Logs for 3 peers collaboration, edit actions are inside dash box and
communication actions are inside line-box. Only local edit actions of each peer
and obligations are showed in this figure.
Consider an example of sharing data in a distributed peer to peer social
network. Users can share photos, videos or music documents between them
and add comment to these documents (but they can not modify the content
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of these documents). The obligations could be: “may read”, “may not read”,
“may add comment”, “may not add comment”, “may delete comment”, “may not
delete comment”, “may share”, “can not be shared”. Figure 1 shows an example
of three peers P1, P2, P3 sharing photos. Let P1 be the creator of data d. P1
shares d with P2, and then P2 shares it with P3. In parallel, P1 shares the same
data directly to P3. The logs of actions (edit log lPx−edt and communication log
lPx−com) are created locally at peers as follows:
1. At the local site, P1 creates document d for which he adds a comment
and shares this document with P2 with the usage obligation “ may read”,
“may share further”. Logical clock starts from 1.
lP1−edt,d = [(1, create
−1
{by,P1}
), (1, comment−1{by,P1})];
lP1−com,d (with P2) = [(2, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(2, read+1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (2, share
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(2, not comment+1{by,P1},{to,P2})]
2. P2 receives document d with associated logs and adds a comment to this
document. The edit log will be updated continuously. Note that the logical
clock of obligations in communication log is updated to the value of the
local logical clock at the site P2. Note also that P2 received document
d with the permission of reading it and sharing it further, but without
the permission of commenting it. However he did the comment action,
therefore, P2 violated the received obligation.
lP2−com,d = [(2, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
), (1, read+1{by,P1},{to,P2}),
(1, share+1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (1, not comment
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
)]
lP2−edt,d = [(1, create
−1
{by,P1}
), (1, comment−1{by,P1})] ∪
[(2, read−1{by,P2}), (2, comment
−1
{by,P2}
)];
3. After sending to P2, P1 adds another comment to document d and re-sends
to P2 this document with obligation “may add comment”. The logical clock
of P1 is increased after each action. P1 also shares data with P3 with the
same obligation “may add comment”.
lP1−edt,d = [(1, create
−1
{by,P1}
, (1, comment−1{by,P1}),
(3, comment−1{by,P1})];
lP1−com,d (with P2) = [(2, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(2, read+1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (2, share
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(2, not comment+1{by,P1},{to,P2}),
(4, share−1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (4, comment
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
)]
lP1−com,d (with P3) = [(5, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P3}
),
(5, comment+1{by,P1},{to,P3)})].
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4. P2 receives document d again from P1 and then shares it with P3 with the
obligation “not share” to do not share further the document. The edit log
of P2 is updated to include the last action done by P1 of commenting the
document.
lP2−com,d (local) = [(2, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(1, read+1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (1, share
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
),
(1, not comment+1{by,P1},{to,P2})]
∪ [(4, share−1{by,P1},{to,P2}), (3, comment
+1
{by,P1},{to,P2}
)
lP2−edt,d = [1, create
−1
{by,P1}
, (1, comment−1{by,P1})]
∪ [(2, read−1{by,P2}), (2, comment
−1
{by,P2}
)] ∪
[(3, comment−1{by,P1})]
lP2−com,d (with P3) = lP2−com,d (local) ∪
[(4, share−1{by,P2},{to,P3}),(4, not share
+1
{by,P2},{to,P3}
)].
5. At local site of P3, suppose that P3 receives document d from P1 before
receiving it from P2. The local communication log of P3 is obtained by
merging lP1−com,d (with P3) computed at step 3 with lP2−com,d (with
P3) computed at step 4.
lP3−com,d = [(5, share
−1
{by,P1},{to,P3}
),
(1, comment+1{by,P1},{to,P3})] ∪ lP2−com (local)
∪ [(4, share−1{by,P2},{to,P3}), (2, not share
+1
{by,P2},{to,P3}
)]
lP3−edt,d = lP2−edt,d
In order to detect cheaters, each peer analyzes the received logs. A user with
actions that do not conform to obligations is considered as a cheater. In the
above example, P3 detects the violation of action comment of P2 in lP2−edt.
5 OBLIGATIONS
Collaborating in a distributed system makes a user possible to receive document
from many collaborators. In the previous example P3 receives the same docu-
ment from P1 and P2. P3 will update document based on the received changes
under certain obligations. Up on the obligations, the system decides to accept
or reject the new copies of data.
When a user receives different obligations, the conflict between obligations
may occur. An obligation conflict means the subjects are both required and
required not to perform the same actions on target objects. In multi-policies
environment, it is possible that one policy overrides another. Conflict detection
should be performed in order to decide which usage policy is performed and
which is ignored. Moreover, in case a user receives a set of obligations instead
of a single obligation, the conflict may occur between sets. Two sets are in
conflict if they contain at least one conflict between two single obligations. One
of the solution to avoid conflict is giving priority to certain obligations.
RR n° 7472
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Obligations can be ordered based on the ability they offer to work on data.
We denote two obligations α1, α2 that α1 > α2 if α1 has more ability to work on
document than α2. For example add−comment > read and share > not share.
The comparison of two sets of obligations can be performed based on comparing
each single obligation belonging to the two sets. For example, [add− comment,
share] > [not add− comment, share].
With the approach using obligations in sharing document, if some obligation
is not specified, for example, neither share nor not share is given, peers can
do the actions as they want without any violation, e.g they can either share or
not share the document.
In obligation-based collaborating systems, the more user respects obliga-
tions, the more trust he gains, and the more possibility others want to collabo-
rate with him.
Unlike single centralized system, in distributed P2P application, peers are
faced with conflicts between rights and obligations referring to the same docu-
ment, but also between changes on the same document. When a peer receives
many copies of the same document, it analyzes the associated logs in order to
assess the local trust values of other peers who collaborated on copies. After-
ward that peer checks for merging the logs and the document. If the obligations
permit that peer to get the changes on document, a merge algorithm is per-
formed. Due to space limitation, we do not present in this paper our algorithms
related to merging document and ordering rights and obligations.
6 TRUST ASSESSMENT
In our decentralized system, each peer evaluates trustworthiness of other peers
based on its experience. During collaboration between peers, trust values are
adjusted mainly upon the result of log analysis. Checking a log is a basic
mechanism to detect cheaters and help to predict the probability that they will
continue cheat in future actions.
We denote T logPi (Pj) as the trust value that a peer Pi evaluates and assigns
to peer Pj . In order to manage trust values for peer Pj , we can use any existing
decentralized trust model. The trust values are initially assigned a default value
by system.
The algorithm 1 takes as input linear logs (edit log and communication log).
This is a local algorithm that peers can apply in order to determine trust on
other peers over the collaborative network. The peer Pi updates value T
log
Pi
(Pj)
for peer Pj based on the result of log analysis.
All peers are set the highest trust value at the beginning (max_trust_value).
In order to detect misbehaviors, peer’s actions are considered violating the obli-
gations if there is one right or obligation which not permit to do that action.
With each event in log, parameter (by, Pi) helps extracting the user Pi who per-
formed the action. We consider action is made by Pi at logical time c. If Pi is
the creator of the document, it has full rights to do any action on the document,
therefore, no need to check for its obligation. In case Pi has received the docu-
ment from another peer, we will check for its actions to compare with the given
obligations. The obligations are kept as a special “event” in communication
log (c, (b)sr) with s = +1. We extract parameter (to, Pj) from this “event”. If
Pj = Pi and the logical clock value cj when obligation was received is less than
RR n° 7472
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Algorithm 1: LOCAL-TRUST-ASSESSMENT
Input: The edit log ledt and the communication log lcom, the document d, user
A who assessing trust.
Output: T
log
A (Pi) for each Pi that appears in logs.
begin
for each (c, e = (a)sr) with s = −1 do
misbehaved = FALSE ;
extract a, Pi in {by, Pi} from r;
T
log
A (Pi) = max_trust_value;
if Pi is not the creator of d then
k = lengthOf(lcom);
checked = FALSE ;
while (k ≥ 1) and (checked = FALSE) do
get (ck, ek = (b)
s
r) ∈ lcom ;
extract b, Pj in {to, Pj} from ek ;
if (s = +1) and (Pj = Pi) and (ck < c) then
if (b = not a) then
misbehaved = TRUE ;
checked = TRUE ;
end
end
k = k − 1;
end
if (misbehaved = TRUE) then
adjust decemently trust value T
log
A (Pi) based one specific trust
model;
end
end
end
end
logical clock value ci when action was performed, that action is considered valid.
As the logical clock of obligation is transformed from sender’s to receiver’s, we
can check whether an action was done before or after a peer received the corre-
sponding obligation. It should be noticed that rights or obligations are possible
to be overridden and the latest ones are taken in account in our algorithm only.
When an assessed peer Pj is detected as a cheater, its local trust value is
decremented by assessing peer Pi. The local trust values could be aggregated
from log-based trust, reputation or recommendation trust. That depends on
the trust model being used. Research on the trust models is out of scope of this
paper.
Our algorithm serves for trust assessment by using logs. The violation in
case a cheating user copies the content of document to create a new one, then
claims him as owner can not be detected by using log auditing itself. However,
communication log could be used to discover the history actions on document
that helps to detect cheaters.
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7 Related Work
In this section we first compare our work with some approaches that address data
privacy in peer-to-peer systems. Then we continue by describing and comparing
our proposed mechanism with other approaches that use some related solutions
to our approach but in different contexts.
In order to return data ownership to users rather than to a third party cen-
tral authority, some recent works [2, 21] explore the coupling between social
networks and peer-to-peer systems. In this context privacy protection is under-
stood as allowing users to encrypt their data and control access by appropriate
key sharing and distribution. Our approach is complementary to this work and
refers to what happens to data after it has been shared.
Another approach that addresses data privacy violation in peer-to-peer en-
vironments is Priserv [6], a DHT privacy service that combines the Hippo-
cratic database principles with the trust notions. Hippocratic databases en-
force purpose-based privacy while reputation techniques guarantee trust no-
tions. However, this approach focuses on a database solution, being limited to
relational tables. Moreover, as opposed to our solution, the Priserv approach
does not propose neither a mechanism of discovering the malicious users that
do not respect the obligations required for using the data nor an approach for
updating the trust values associated to users.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) defined
basic privacy principles including: collection limitation, data quality, purpose
specification, use limitation, security safe, openness, individual participation,
accountability. We consider data privacy in collaborative working from the
point of use limitation that users will specify how their data may and may not
be used. We consider the decentralized system which documents are exchanged
and shared among users. When a user receives a document, he is expected to
work on the document by respecting obligations. The log mechanism is used
to detect cheaters who do not respect their obligations. Unlike access control
which is concerned with granting access to sensitive data based on conditions
that relate to past or present, obligation which impose conditions on the future
is concerned with commitments of the involved users. At the moment access
is granted to data, adherence to these commitments cannot be ensured. The
formal framework in [5] allows specification of obligations. They present dif-
ferent mechanisms for checking adherence to commitments. However, all their
proposed solutions are based on a central reference monitor that can ensure
that data protection requirements are adhered to. As opposed to our approach,
these solutions are not suitable for peer-to-peer environments where there is no
central authority.
Keeping and managing event logs is frequently used for ensuring security and
privacy. This approach has been studied in many works. In [7], a log auditing
approach is used for detecting misbehavior in collaborative work environments,
where a small group of users share a large number of documents and policies. In
[10, 17], a logical policy-centric for behavior-based decision-making is presented.
The framework consists of a formal model of past behaviors of principals which
is based on event structures. However, these models require a central authority
to audit the log to help the system making decisions and this is a limitation for
using these models in a fully decentralized environment.
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Trust management is an important aspect of the solution that we proposed.
The concept of trust in different communities varies according to how it is
computed and used. Our work relies on the concept of trust which is based on
past encounters: “Trust is a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s
future behavior based on the history of their encounters” [12]. Various trust
models for peer to peer systems exist such as NICE model [18], EigenTrust model
[8] and global trust model [1] and our mechanism for discovering misbehaved
users can be coupled with any existing trust model in order to manage user
trust values.
8 Conclusion
Our vision is to replace central authority-based social software collaboration
with a distributed collaboration that offers support for decentralization of ser-
vices. In this context, our paper addressed the issue of data privacy violation
due to data disclosure to malicious peers in a peer-to-peer collaboration. In
our collaboration model users share their private data by specifying some obli-
gations the receivers must follow. Modifications done by users on the shared
data and the obligations that must be followed when data is shared are logged
in a distributed manner. A mechanism of distributed log auditing is applied
during collaboration and users that did not conform to the required obligations
are detected and therefore their trust value is updated. Any distributed trust
model can be applied to our proposed mechanism. Users can perform concur-
rent modifications on the shared documents as well as they can share documents
with different specified obligations according to their preferences.
A direction of future work is the evaluation of the proposed mechanism.
We will test first the efficiency and complexity of our algorithms in peer-to-
peer simulators such as PeerSim [14]. We plan afterward to apply our trust
management approach to existing research peer-to-peer online social networks
such as PeerSoN [15].
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